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Coloniality and globalization: a decolonial take

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ABSTRACT
I will address here the Special Forum leading question: ‘Is an integrated theory of globalization possible (and desirable)?’ I will add: is it necessary? If it is, what for and for whom is it necessary and beneficial? I have no illusion of providing a convincing answer to the Special Forum’s leading questions and my own additions. But I am writing this essay with another question in mind, asked in the introduction to Globalization Matters, the book that prompted this Special Forum: What is happening to globalization? I hope to provide some entrypoint into those questions, starting from the receiving ends because there are many, of globalization. What I mean by this is that while modern/colonial world order was constituted by actors, institutions and languages located in the mutation of Western Christendom to continental Europe and its extension to the US, thus forming the North Atlantic, all the remaining regions and people in the planet became, by default, receptors (by will or in spite of) of Western global designs. Chief among them is global linear thinking that contributed greatly to mapping the contours of the Westernization of the World and set up the foundations of what, in neo-liberal vocabulary since the 1980s, has been termed ‘globalization’.

The bibliography on globalization in the past thirty years is overwhelming. The bibliography on coloniality is not. Coloniality, in my argument, unfolds from the work of Peruvian sociologist,
thinker and activist Aníbal Quijano. In his conceptualization and the school of thought that grew and expanded after him, coloniality is always already a decolonial concept. Hence, my argument is a decolonial one. It is not a descriptive essay with comments on what has been said about globalization here and there, yesterday and today, but what can be said from a decolonial perspective. In that regard, the authors, books or essays I quote are convoked because the point they make expounds my decolonial argument. I do not quote excellent scholarly work on globalization because they are excellent. The majority are written from a modern or postmodern perspective. To avoid the potential reader’s confusion thinking that globalization is an issue and there are different interpretations, I should underline that in this essay I make the distinction between changes in the content (the said, the enunciated) and the terms of the conversations (the saying, the enunciation). Many excellent works in North Atlantic scholarship operate at the level of the content. Decoloniality introduced the perspective of the Third World and as such confronts the terms of the conversation (the saying, the enunciation) (Mignolo, 2010). I am writing from the receiving end of the epistemic colonial difference, which is a crucial issue today for resistance and has turned into re-existence: what global linear thinking and globalism did was precisely to outcast ways of knowing and knowledge that do not bend to Western European and North Atlantic epistemic regulations that now are resurfing in diverse levels, spheres and areas of experience. From the eruption after the killing of George Floyd to the fissures between the US and EU on one hand, and China, Russia and Iran on the other, the consequences of colonial (people of different colours, religions, memories, languages) and imperial (civilizational States who are not bending to North Atlantic nation-States) ontological and epistemic differences can no longer be suppressed: the resistance to globalization is basically the re-existence of ways and modes of knowing and living, disobeying and unfulfilling the expectation of North Atlantic scholarship.

In this vein, Manfred Steger introduced a necessary correction to the vocabulary with the word ‘globalism’ to underscore neo-liberal designs and market ideology overcoming liberal social concerns (Steger, 2001). Although it focuses on the market and on the last decades of the twentieth century, ‘globalism’ – in my view – is tantamount to Western modern/colonial global designs, the Westernization of the world, unipolarity and the rhetoric of salvation (conversion, progress and civilization). As Steger pointed out, the rhetorical promotion of ‘globalization’ operated, and still does, on the make-belief that globalization just happens, that no one is in charge of it and that it benefits all, as a ‘natural’ consequence of the unfolding of universal history. The rhetoric of modernity, and post-modern globalization if you wish, hides the global designs first planted by Christian conversion and international law to legitimize possession and dispossession of land. The secularization of the Christian theological framework (Anghie, 2006) in the eighteenth century secured the hegemony of Western rules and methods of knowing, the canonization of knowledges and of theological, philosophical and scientific vocabularies created during and since the Renaissance by European men, institutions and languages as an in-visible cloud dispersed all over the planet.

For better or worse, the clouds of Westernization contaminated everyone in the planet, directly or indirectly encroaching on all areas of human experience. Agriculture and raising livestock to live were converted into activities for profit which involved dispossession of lands, exploitations of labour, and more recently, poisoning the lands with the purpose of increasing production and enriching Western global markets. Living to work before 1500 mutated into working to live since 1500. The massive Atlantic slave trade remains the most enduring moment of this mutation. Non-capitalist markets were transformed into capitalist markets. The constitution of the modern/colonial world order and frame of mind to which the rhetoric of modernity was and continued
to be a crucial factor of justification and legitimization operates on the simultaneous forces of destitution in every area of life that doesn’t fit modern/colonial global designs.

The simultaneous movement of modernity (constitution)/coloniality (destitution) is the underlying force of globalism, which also spurred the constitution of Western Civilization since the Renaissance and the retrospective foundations of its origins in Greece and Rome. The processes of constitution/destitution were inaugurated in the New World during the sixteenth century by the subjugation of local cultures and civilizations and by the enslavement of African human beings. The legitimizing rhetoric and the implementation of the logic of coloniality and in Asia and Africa in the subsequent centuries, was secured by the commercial enterprises of the British East India (1600) and Dutch East India Companies (1601). In the nineteenth century French, British, German and Belgian settlements in Africa were locked up during the Berlin Conference of 1885-1885. Last but not least, the Opium War that destabilized centuries of Chinese civilizations also played a part. Although China was not colonized, like India for example, it did not escape coloniality.

II

The simultaneous movement of constitution/destitution provoked various responses. One of them was the reconstitution of the destituted. Let me give you three examples to understand what I am saying. It is also necessary to address the question of the Special Forum on whether a unified theory of globalization is possible and/or necessary. The first case is from the end of the sixteenth and first two decades of the seventeenth centuries, the second from the late eighteenth century, and the third from the first half of the twentieth century.

What connects these three cases and the momentum driving them is neither a chronology in the same space, nor the configuration of one culture or civilization, yet presumptions of the Western world’s narrative logic obscure the connections without further investigation. In fact, how could you connect the Spanish invasion of Tawantinsuyu in 1532 and the subsequent constitution of the Viceroyalty of Peru, with the first Dutch settlements in South Africa in 1652 and the British destitution of the Mughal Sultanate and their settlement in India in 1858? It is difficult to do so through the lens of Western modernity, but easy to see if we observe how the logic of coloniality works. What the three cases have in common are the simultaneous movements of constitution/destitution of communal praxes of living. The three events are interconnected Westernizing global designs. Though the local memories, sensibilities and praxes of living in each place are radically different, they become connected through Westernization.

II.1.

In the 1980s, the buzzword was ‘nation’. In the 1990s two buzzwords displaced it: ‘globalization’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’. The first was associated with neo-liberal designs after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the illusion of the ‘end of history’, occupying the attention of the social sciences and the mass media. The second was the concern of humanists in an effort to bypass the restrictions of the nation and nationalism. Both have one element in common: the celebration of overcoming national (meaning nation-States’) boundaries. There was a third word which did not make the noise that globalization and cosmopolitanism did. The word and concept also emerged at the beginning of the nineties and has gained ground since, but not as much as the previous two. This word was ‘coloniality’. As it surfaced in Spanish and in the so-called Third World too,
Colonialidad was authorized neither in its language nor in its birthplace by the epistemic regulations of modernity. Whatever was relevant to global debate was already established by and limited to English, French and German. This simple example illustrates how coloniality of knowledge works and how it deforms our understanding of globalization.

There are good reasons to understand why coloniality was not as popular as globalization and cosmopolitanism. The reasons have much to do with ‘coloniality of knowledge’, which of course could not have been conceived before the concept of coloniality came into being. And believe me that all of this is further embedded in the coloniality of knowledge that sustain the idea of globalization. Coloniality of knowledge, in fact, has to do with the expansive globalization of knowledge since the sixteenth century. Christian missionaries globalizing Christian theology and conversion were in the New World, Japan and China in the sixteenth century and later on in Africa, along with the rest of Asia. They couldn’t do much in Russia, for the Orthodox Church had different plans and Western Christians were not welcome. And you may wonder why today Russia remains a bad fellow for Western political ‘sentiments’ (and I mean sentiments, not reason). From the eighteenth century on, secular philosophy and science led the way to disseminate Western knowledges around the planet. The University, since the sixteenth century, was a spearhead for the globalization of everything else: government, economy, art, aesthetics, technological instruments, etc., all of which came with globalization of knowledge and its underside, the coloniality of knowledge. Government required political theory, economy operated by a political economy, art depended on aesthetic principles and instruments on the triumphalism of the industrial revolution, philosophy was sold alongside its Greeks foundations and science with its renaissance of a scientific revolution, etc. I will come back to these issues in section III.2.

Local knowledges were destituted in the process of constituting the idea of Western Civilization, the master platform of knowledge and ways of knowing. In contradistinction with all co-existing civilizations, Western Civilization needed to destitute others in order to constitute itself as such. Western Civilization is the youngest of all known civilizations in the planet; it is only 700 years old (1300-2020). However, modernity and globalization are younger, 1500-2000. The European Renaissance between 1300 and 1500 was a regional European phenomenon and it became the first civilization that impinged over all co-existing ones and managed to convince many (including the inventors, promoters and benefactors themselves) that all co-existing civilizations were marching behind. The denial of coevalness (contemporaneity) was a master strategy to deny contemporaneity to the rest of the world and to appropriate the idea of time, rendering it in the unilinear succession controlled by Eurocentered narratives.

From 1500 on, the idea of Europe built by Europeans themselves went hand in hand with the growing sentiment of its centrality on the planet. G.W.F. Hegel provided the secular master narrative that displaced and replaced the master Christian theological narrative from the creation of the world to the final judgement (Hegel, 1837). For Hegel’s secular universal history began with the coming into view of the Spirit in ancient China and its march to and triumphal arrival in Europe and Germany. Germany was, for Hegel, the centre of Europe and Europe the centre of the world. Hegel’s narrative evinces that globalization is mainly the control of knowledge that interprets the ‘facts’ connecting diverse regions in the planet. But while globalization appears in the series of narrated events, the narration itself cannot be global. It is always local. Hence, Western control of knowledge to create global designs supported the experience of its own local history (Mignolo, 2000/2012, pp. 3–39).

For the first time in the history of human kind, the entire planet was circumnavigated in the sixteenth century. Cartography for the first time in the history of the human kind provided visual
depictions of lands and water masses. Christian theologians travelled from the New World to the Philippines, to Formosa (today Taiwan) and Macao (when Hong Kong did not yet exist). Seventeenth-century expeditions, starting with the creation of the British East India and Dutch East India Companies in 1600 and 1601, respectively, paralleled the movements of Christian theologians. By the nineteenth century, British and French settlements appeared in Africa, and by the mid-century – between the Opium Wars – British settlers established themselves in India after 150 years of commercial work by the British East India Company. All of this was not yet called globalization, although its template was there. It was not called Westernization either, but in retrospect commercial enterprises and political settlements were possible due to Europeans controlling the seas and exporting their own ways of doing things in the rest of the globe.

From the New World to Africa and Asia, the tentacles of Europé’s regional concepts of economy, politics, ideas, education and the corresponding institutions, were exported around the planet. The planet was also named ‘the globe’. In the nineteenth century globalization was booming, propelled by the Industrial Revolution, the steamboat that enlarged the transport of people and goods, and by the railroads built through continental lands like veins of blood in the body’s circulatory system. The ‘globe’ that until then was circumnavigated along coastlines was opened up to its interior, allowing Europe to extract whatever it desired as far as the railroads could reach, carrying their finds back to the port and back to England and Europe. Changes from then to now are only a matter of scale and, as I explain below, of political confrontations that did not exist at that time. Those that did were between European imperial nation-States. Today the confrontation is between North Atlantic imperial nation-States, and nation-States that emerged in the former colonies after decolonization, while others emerged from the mutation of dynastic governances into nation-States as in the cases of Japan, China, Soviet Russia/Russian Federation. None of these places were colonized in the way that South Asia, North Africa and the New World were. They were not colonized but did not escape coloniality.

One dimension is crucial to understand the force of coloniality in shaping up the global order since the sixteenth century, and that is knowledge: more specifically, coloniality of knowledge. Frantz Fanon’s observation based on his experience during the Algerian war of liberation transcends that specific moment, apprehending the logic of epistemic coloniality from the sixteenth to the twenty-first century. Where Fanon says ‘colonialism’ in the quotation below, replace it with ‘coloniality’.

Colonialism is not satisfied with snaring the people in its net or of draining the colonized brain of any for or substance. With a kind of perverted logic, it turns its attention to the past of the colonized people and distorts it, disfigures it, and destroys it. This effort to demean history prior to colonization today takes on a dialectical significance. (Fanon 1963, p. 149)

We can also read ‘globalization’ instead of colonialism. What matters here however is that colonialism doesn’t equal coloniality. Colonialism refers, in the theoretical framework opened up by Aníbal Quijano, chiefly since the very early 1990s, to particular colonialisms (Spanish, Portuguese, French, Dutch, British) while coloniality refers to the underlying logic of all Western (North Atlantic) colonialism. In that sense coloniality is also the underlying logic of globalization since 1500. Coloniality doesn’t refer to Roman colonialism, or the Ottoman Sultanate’s managed territories, or the Inca’s expanded territoriality. What distinguishes coloniality from other superficially similar forms of control and management is the conjunction of Western constitution of an institutional, conceptual machinery to regulate all areas of human experience with an intervention in all co-existing civilizations to ‘distort, disfigure and destroy’ their past, disturbing the present of the people.
intervened. Examples range from the dismantling of the Incanate in the South American Andes to the Aztec Tlatoanate in the Valle of Mexico to the dismantling of Iraq, Libya, as well as the persistent harassment of so-called ‘rogue’ states and their undesirable rulers and leaders. The logic of coloniality is deep-seated and always masked by the rhetoric of modernity, whether that rhetoric claims to civilize the barbarians or spread democracy when the barbarians didn’t elect nor ask.

II.2.

‘Global linear thinking’ is a compound concept introduced by German legal philosopher and thinker Carl Schmitt in his book *The Nomos of the Earth* (Schmitt, 2006). Global linear thinking is a modern European concept, not a decolonial one, like coloniality is. What follows is a decolonial rendering of Schmitt’s concept. In my reading global linear thinking illuminates, in retrospect, the historical foundation of globalization. The complete title of Schmitt’s books is *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*. Schmitt perceived a change of epoch happening around 1500: the *first nomos* of the earth began to be displaced and finally overcome by the *second nomos*. The second *nomos* presupposed the unipolarity of global linear thinking, legally regulating the partitions and ordering of the globe according to European interests.

Before elaborating on these issues, a few words on the *nomos* of the earth are in order. The meaning of *nomos*, an ancient Greek word, cannot be translated smoothly into the European imperial vernacular of Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese prevalent during the Renaissance, or English, German, and French since the Enlightenment. It would require a different strategy to translate it into Mandarin, Arabic or Urdu, for example. The point I am underlining is that while modern European languages drink from Greek springs, Mandarin and Urdu do not. Arab-Muslim thinkers translated and expanded ancient Greek ideas in various fields (Al-Jabri, 2011; Saliba, 2007), but Greece is not a foundational reference and Rome even less so. Rather than ‘law’ which is common translation, *nomos* would be better understood as ‘regulation’ and ‘order’ implicit or explicit, oral or written: what people do to regulate and organize the life of a community. It would be better understood in a compound word like *oyko-nomos*, the organization or regulation of the *oykos* – the extended family, beyond blood relations, forming a communal praxis of living.

Schmitt’s distinction between the first and the second *nomos* of the earth evidences Eurocentric blindness: beyond Europe there is no order, whatever there is, it is outside of the *nomos*. Schmitt’s first *nomos* looks like a unsaid remake of Hegel’s lesson in the philosophy of history in which beyond Greece and Europe Asia was the past, America the future, and Africa out of history. Decolonially interpreted, all cultures and civilizations in the planet before 1500 were diversely co-existent with what Schmitt terms the first *nomos*, forgetting to make explicit that he was referring to the *first European nomos*. In fact, the very idea of the first *nomos* is constituted in the simultaneous movement of destituting co-existing orders and regulations in non-European cultures and civilizations. Consequently, decolonially interpreted, the first *nomos* consisted of co-existing human organizations within, roughly, the territories of Western Christians, north of the Mediterranean and west of Greece and Jerusalem. Beyond the first *nomos* remained the as-yet unnamed territories beyond Western Christian consciousness.

The destitution of worlds that the first *nomos* implanted (a concept that at once names and un-names, constitutes and destitutes simultaneously) was necessary for Schmitt to introduce the second *nomos*. In the first, the New World was not yet in the European consciousness, and the Old World (Europe, Asia and Africa) was unknown to its inhabitants. Globalization was impossible at that point, which doesn’t mean there was no traffic across the Old World (the Silk Road is one
example) or among cultures and civilizations in the new one, from the South of the continent to the Andes, to Mesoamerica, and what is today North America (including the US). No, globalization was not yet possible because an entire continent wasn’t in the picture as drawn by and for actors and institutions creating Atlantic commercial circuits (Mignolo, 2000/2012, ‘Introduction’).

The second nomos came into view from the regulations of international law, created to regulate global linear thinking. There was no international law until the middle of the sixteenth century (Anghie, 2005). It was initiated by Francisco de Vitoria in Salamanca, Spain, and continued by Francisco Suárez. Hugo Grotius followed suit at the beginning of the seventeenth century, doing for The Netherlands what Vitoria and Suárez did for the Iberian Peninsula, now Spain, and Portugal respectively. Later on, John Locke continued the tradition regulating the second nomos for the British Crown. From there to the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 there is a continuous process of inter-European state conflicts disputing the control of the world. In 1945 a displacement in the management of the second nomos occurred when the US entered the scene, regulating the world order and displacing its predecessor, the UK. When Schmitt, in 1950, traced the emergence of the second nomos to 1500, the US was not yet the hegemon.

The second nomos under the auspices of international law secured possession and dispossession of lands, control of territories and the right of North Atlantic imperial formations self-appointed to intervene in foreign lands under the rhetoric of keeping global peace and world order. The instrument of international law was global linear thinking, thinking that mapped the world in two complementary dimensions geo-politically and corpo-politically. The first organized the planet hierarchically by continents. While continental hierarchy of Europe, Asia and Africa already existed among Western Christianity, the sixteenth century incorporated the Americas into the previous continental trinity. Simultaneously, people were ranked according to the continent they inhabited. Racial classifications introduced one of many dimensions of corpo-political ranking. Men and women inhabiting Africa, Asia and America’s First Nations were considered lesser humans.

Corpo-political divides are not only domestic classifications but encroached in the hierarchy of the global order too, including people running governments and corporations as well as actors in the intellectual and scientific sphere (Dabashi, 2015b; Mahbubani, 1998/2002). These were and are classifications made by a select few, epistemic inventions rather than linguistic representations: He who controls money controls knowledge and controls meaning. Racial classifications were first based on blood: the expulsion of Moors and Jews from the Iberian Peninsula after 1492, for example, allowed the Inquisition to implant the law of ‘purity of blood’ which resulted in either deportation or conversion. Those who remained in Castile became Moriscos and Conversos. How religious conversions secured the purity of blood requires indeed a work of imagination. In the New World, public policies were less restrictive for two reasons: First Nations could not be expelled because the invaders were Europeans and enslaved Africans could of course not be expelled because they were forced to migrate to the New World! Hence, public policy did not enforce purity of blood but established the regulation by mixed blood. On top of the triangle were Castilians, and the two bottom corners were occupied by ‘Indians’ and ‘Blacks’. There were no Indians in the New World nor Blacks in Africa. The New World was inhabited by numerous and diverse cultures and civilizations, Aztecs, Mayas, Incas the best known among them when the Spanish arrived, as well as the Iroquois when the British settled in their territories, not Indians. In Africa, most of the population had black skin but they were not Blacks. They were inhabitants of the Kingdoms of Mali, Ghana, Jolot, Mossi, etc. Indians and Blacks are racial classifications – and hence, racist ones.
Racial classifications involve everyone; there is no one outside of the system or the sentiments it engenders, both among the classified and the classifiers. There is no classifier among the classified. Here lies the darker side of global linear thinking – that is, of globalization. The only way out for the classified who is always hierarchically destituted is to take the negative classification and turn it into pride. Which requires a reconstitution of epistemic classifications, a genoseological re-ordering and a removal of geo-political partitions of body and land, an ultimate unveiling of the fictional underpinnings of the presumed ontology of verbal and visual representations. Racial classifications go hand in hand with those of sexual orientation and gender identity, though their relations are asymmetrical, because racial and sexual/gender classifiers – that is, those who invented the classifications – were Christian White males.

II.3.

What has all this to do with globalization? Everything. Globalization isn’t just trade, transportation, fast cybernetic interconnections, the sale of information, and all manner of things material and aethereal you could add to the list. Or better yet, globalization IS thought to be all of that, packaged in the language of progress and civilization, buzzwords of the West until WWII, of modernization and development recalling the talk of the fifties and sixties, and our lingo since the eighties of development and market democracy, the last chapter of the long story of Westernization: the neoliberal story of globalization.

All of the above is only half of the story. What is missing is the other half, coloniality, the invisible hand that clears the way, materially and mentally, in the European march from the Renaissance to modernity, backwards and forwards, justifying global military bases and markets, technological outposts, and heroic narratives where enemies are always defeated so that audiences feel safe. Indeed, Hollywood became a powerful promoter when the march was over, and the banners were taken down by the US after WWII. Coloniality is what modernity masks: that our enemies are neighbours miscast as boogeymen to legitimize their subjugation. The North Atlantic (the US and the EU) continues to interfere ‘over there’ with massive migrations and refugees from the West not to plant settlements, but rather military bases and armies, diplomatic negotiations, installations of universities in the Middle East, China and Singapore, and other select means of interference.

The entire planet is today crossed by maritime and railroad lines, by airplanes and electromagnetic waves, ranked in taxonomies of West and East, Third and First Worlds, developed and underdeveloped countries, emerging and full fledged economies: global linear thinking is one finger of the invisible hand that supports the classifying logic of coloniality. Two tools in the invisible hands are colonial and imperial differences.

III

Conceptually, these differences have a common classificatory logic: one is epistemic, the other ontological. Both, however, are epistemic outcomes for the simple reason that ontology is an epistemic category. What there is doesn’t determine how we know it; it is our knowing that determines what there is. Beyond the limits of the known remains the unknown as yet, the nebulous ‘reality’. Or, as Humberto Maturana puts it, we human beings do not know what there is, we just know what we know (Maturana, 1988).
III.1

The common thread in the fashioning of colonial and imperial differences sets the stage for some unwitting players as ontologically inferior, a suspicious, dangerous pack, handed the script of someone else’s agenda mouthed against the backdrops of their much maligned home. No audition was sought by those typecast to tell such tales: central casting discovered them, turning its blinding spotlight on their spooky religions, exotic skin tones and mysterious accents, to say nothing of their homelands’ natural resources ripe for the taking, and audiences believed what they were taught to see. Regionally, seventeenth-century European cartography imprinted both the map and the minds of its viewers four continents and their hierarchy: Europe was staged in the upper left corner, the place of privilege for a culture in which alphabetic writing goes from left to right and top to bottom. Newspapers editors know this: the most important information is printed in the upper left corner above the fold (Mignolo, 2003, pp. 274–281).

People considered ontologically inferior were and are cast to be epistemically deficient as well, persons unable to reason like Western human beings do. Consequences of such impairment manifest, for the Western observer, in their inferiors’ form of governance, economy, religion and praxis of living, deviations from the norms of the observer. The problem arises when the observer’s norms become hegemonic, carrying a force of conviction for both the observer and the observed, so that the invented norms become the ‘representations’ of ‘reality’: that’s just how it is, the dictum goes. This is the common logic that grounded the colonial and imperial differences, epistemic and ontologic, still at work today. Globalization since the sixteenth century is the outcome of global linear thinking of observers (actors, institutions, languages) able to establish colonial and imperial difference to regulate the world order. The world cannot be changed if the people who run and inhabit it do not change their assumptions, beliefs, knowing and orientations of their/our praxes of living.

Colonial and imperial differences are strategies of domination projected onto two distinct types of human beings and onto the regions of the imaginary Christian world (Europe, Africa, Asia, New World/America) they inhabit. Both are decolonial concepts to disclose what is hidden under the rhetoric of modernity, progress, development and happiness for all. Both strategies worked quite well, if not perfectly of course, until 2000. Western imperial states and their respective institutions, including international institutions created by North Atlantic states (e.g. the UN, IMF, World Bank, NATO, etc.), dominated the world order, even if conflicts among themselves led to WWI, and later WWII. Four hundred years of European hegemony and dominance cannot go without consequences. Two of them were the outgrowth of the US and Japan. The US was within European prognosis of the future world order: Hegel anticipated that the US was the future in the same movement that he declared that Africa was the past (Hegel, 1837/1876). Japan was out of Hegel forward looking and most likely off Western imagination: ‘yellow’ people were not supposed to think by themselves (Dabashi, 2015a; Mahbubani, 1898/2002a). He could not have predicted the Opium War and Japan’s indirect responses to it: the Meiji Restoration that aligned Japan with Western idea of progress, although quietly disinclined to engage in Western civilization’s missions. Japan had their own civilization.

These new players in the changing world order, entered the game at the end of the nineteenth century. Japan was victorious in the First Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895) and in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). On its side, the US was victorious of the Hispano-American War (1898). As a consequence, the Caribbean Hispanic possessions and the Philippines passed into the hands of the US. Japan’s unexpected bombing of Pearl Harbor cued the US to enter WWII. The defeat of Japan (bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), and the devastation of Europe left the US as the
leader and sole regulator of the world order. The history is well known as well as the institutions created to regulate the world order (IMF, UN, Universal Declaration of Human Rights).

The US global hegemony since 1950 turned into world domination in the twenty-first century. The period 1950–1970 was characterized by the rhetoric of modernization of development of the Third World. Significant mutations in the global order and in the US, the hegemon, surfaced by 1970: civil rights movements and the consequences of American domestic politics since then, the uprising after the killing of George Floyd being the most recent, the end of welfare states, the global turmoil of 1968, and struggles for decolonization in Asia and Africa to name a few. By the end of the 1970s neo-liberal ideas planted in the fifties (Hayek, 1994) began to flourish and, as it is well known, were crowned by President Ronald Reagan in connivance with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher; both contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union. What shall be remarked in this alliance is that the decay of the British Empire losing its colonial possessions was succeeded by the emergence of an Anglo-US global empire. It was not the Spirit of European colonialism that migrated to the US but, rather, the Anglo UK Spirit that came into being in 1776 out of British former colonies. It shall not surprise us that the Reagan-Thatcher alliance was followed by Bush-Blair and by Trump-Johnson. Liberalism turned into neo-liberalism and the previous rhetoric promoting modernization and development rolled over into globalization and market democracy. Globalization names the globalist neo-liberal project that took off in the eighties, flourished in the nineties and entered a period of demise in the twenty-first century. Two events signposted this foundering: 9/11 of course, and 12/11 in which China was admitted to the WTO.

III.2

I need to remind the reader of a series of events commonly known in order to weave them into a story not commonly told. For example, the US domestic Civil Rights movement of 1969 is not generally connected with the Bandung Conference of 1955 and decolonial liberation struggles in Asia and Africa from 1947 (India) to the end of the 70s (the Iranian Revolution of 1979); the emergence of neo-liberalism and its key word ‘globalization’ is not generally connected with the global eruptions of the political society in Western Europe and the US to reclaim the dignity that globalization has taken and continues to take from them with the increasing numbers of migrants from the former Third World invading Western Europe and the US. Instead, what is emphasized is the increasing adherence to right-wing fundamentalism that takes advantage of the democratic disconnect, waning middle-class privileges, fading working class jobs, and massive migrations implicitly saying ‘we are here because you were there’. Neoliberals’ global designs, sold as globalization, were the last chapter in the long history of Westernization and North Atlantic management, as well as the control of the colonial matrix of power. Chaos and disorder are already the consequences seen in the West as the US and EU lose hegemonic leadership, entering a period of forced dominance to retain privileges that can hardly return.

The prognosis that 2020–2030 will be an ‘infamous decade’ is not out of line. There are several reasons to support it and I offer a decolonial one. A decolonial perspective is grounded in the history of coloniality, a shorthand for the colonial matrix (pattern) of power (CMP) which is the underlying structure of modernity, of Western Civilization and the mover of globalization since the sixteenth century. My argument to this point was based on the history of the colonial matrix of power (CMP) and its surface manifestations in the events I mentioned earlier. Coloniality and colonial matrix of power are always already decolonial concepts. Hence, working through
the instrumentalization of coloniality in the colonial matrix of power brings about decolonial thinking. Coloniality of power is the hidden strategy under the promises of modernity. The CMP is the instrument to implement it.

The prognosis I advance, consequently, is based on the history of CMP. Briefly described here for the purpose of my argument, it consists in the formation, conceptualization, management, and control of four areas of human experiences: (1) knowing and understanding; (2) governance; (3) economy and (4) humanness. The four areas existed of course before 1500 in all co-existing cultures and civilizations. The circumstance created by the ‘discovery’ of the New World, its colonization, the massive Atlantic slave trade spirited by Spain, Portugal, Holland, France and England prompted a new vision and subjectivity to politics, economy and human relations.

The ‘infamous decade’ would be moved by three simultaneous and interrelated conflicts, disputes and rejections of the four CMP’s basic domains, framing and controlling four areas of human experience, that I explain below: de-Westernization and decoloniality at large (e.g. the coming into being of global political protests and organizations re-claiming the human dignity destituted in and by the constitution of Man/Human as the measuring stick of humanness; Romeis & Verden-Zoller, 2009; Wynter, 2003).

Re-formulation of the four basic areas of human experience began in the sixteenth century prompted by the opening of the Atlantic commercial circuits (Mignolo, 2012, pp. 3–48). Knowing and understanding guiding praxes of living in established civilizations (Mayan, Aztec, Incan and Iroquois to name those better known), were destituted and displaced by the constitution of epistemic and hermeneutic regulations managed by Christian theology and renaissance humanism. Governance of the major civilizations Europeans encountered was destituted and replaced by viceroyalties in the areas controlled by Spain and Portugal. North America was home to a different set of processes. The United Kingdom was not a major imperial power at the time as Spain and Portugal were. In the South, today Virginia, the first settlements were commercial, and in Massachusetts and Plymouth, Pilgrim settlements were not in a position to displace existing First Nations but to negotiate with them. Furthermore, their goals were not those of conquest. They were voluntary refugees escaping from the control of the Church of England. It took two and a half centuries for the Anglo-Creoles (i.e. born in the New World from British descent) to achieve the ‘American Revolution’, the constitution of the Republic and the increasing destitution of local forms of governance.

Economy had a similar fate. Local economies of reciprocity and shared communal lands (not to be confused with communism!) from the Mapuches in Southern Chile, to the Andeans and Mesoamerican Civilizations to the Iroquois and First Nations of North America (currently the US and Canada) were destituted in the process of constituting an economy of accumulation, based on expropriation of land and massive exploitation of labour, later on called capitalism. This well-known quote from Aníbal Quijano and Immanuel Wallerstein summarizes the point:

The modern world-system was born in the long sixteenth century. The Americas as a geosocial construct were born in the long sixteenth century. The creation of this geosocial entity, the Americas, was the constitutive act of the modern world-system. The Americas were not incorporated into an already existing capitalist world economy. There could not have been a capitalist world economy without the Americas. (Quijano & Wallerstein, 1992; italics added)

After this co-authored essay, all of us who followed Quijano’s lead start from the formation of the modern/colonial world system towards 1500. That is, modernity/coloniality. The constitutive
act has been examined and scrutinized, by Quijano’s followers, into the four areas of experience constitutive of CMP.

The fourth area of experience is indissociable from the previous three and it concerns that of the self-constitution of the human subject that deserves to control and manage knowledge, governance and the economy, and is the model Human upon which Humanity shall be patterned. Racism and sexism (colonial differences) were invented to regulate the image, Man and Human conceived on the self-image and likeness of male actors. Such re-configuration was the constitutive act of racism and sexism and the destitution of the humanness of European women but, above all, of any part of the world population, male and female, that did not fit the self-definition of Man/Human. Outside of Europe, racism and sexism were two aspects of ontological and epistemic destitution. Man/Human were and are the drivers of the constitutive acts of the modern/colonial world order, two foundational consequences in the making of colonial and imperial differences. In this frame, Patriarchy is not restricted to a question of gender and sexuality; it is the overarching Spirit that governs and controls the CMP.7

The constitution of the CMP and the four areas of experience grounded in global linear thinking guided the processes of Westernization that I mentioned before. Global linear thinking and international law, since the sixteenth century, mapped visually and legally, the word order according to Europeans visions and interests (Schmitt, 2006). Global linear thinking and Westernization implies at each step the destitution of areas of experiences alien to the four CMP domains. They were not of course without critique. Marx, Nietzsche, Spengler, Heidegger engaged in intramural critiques of their own civilization contributing to the hopes promised by epochs of change. However, when the signs point to the change of epoch rather than to the repetitiously known epoch of change doubts began to be cast on the unilinear path of progress and hopes promoted by the rhetoric of modernity. Intramural critiques of Western civilizations were and are still are necessary but they are highly insufficient (Mignolo, 2002; Mignolo, 2015). The signs of epoch change were perceived in the West itself after the failure of the Bush-Cheney mandate, when former President Barack Obama took the first step to revamp Westernization, initiating the process of Re-Westernization. In so doing, he conserved neo-liberal globalism and the rhetoric of modernity, a rhetoric of change promising sustainable developments. Obama’s diplomatic moves to regain confidence in US leadership that was significantly damaged during the Bush-Cheney misdirection, began to be dismantled when Donald Trump was elected president in 2016. Under his motto ‘MAGA’, Trump contributed to accelerate the demise of the US politically, economically and culturally. Taken together, these signs show that the West has lost Western (US and the EU) control and cannot manage the monster (CMP) they made.8 Hence, the prognosis of a forthcoming ‘infamous decade’ is based on the analysis of CMP, its foundation and history, and the current tailspin out of control due to mismanagement. Such symptoms inform the sentiment that the US and the EU can no longer be world leaders, despite wishful thinking of liberal intellectuals.9

The downfall of the US and EU from the privileged positions after WWII is not the outcome of internal error, but rather of miscalculation. A failure to understand that five hundred years of Westernization, of Western modernity and civilization pushing and bullying beyond its own lands, created the reformation backlash that Kishore Mahbubani – based in Singapore rather than in London or New York – felt, sensed, perceived and diagnosed in 2008 as the irreversible processes of de-Westernization (Maḥbūbānī, 2008). If 9/11 was a telling sign of the collapse of Westernization, 12/11 was another warning of de-Westernization following the inter-State BRICS coalition (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in June of 2006. The judicial coup in Brazil involving the destitution of Dilma Rousseff and the sidelining of Lula da Silva, both founders of the BRICS
coalition, and the election of Jair Bolsonaro who realigned Brazil with re-Westernization, in turn, weakening the BRICS, evinces the ‘democratic’ dilemma in former colonies between the left joining de-Westernization (Lula da Silva, Dilma Rousseff) and the right working to join re-Westernizing global designs. However, the more recent consolidation of Russia and China and their relations with Iran are securing a solid block of power to continue the irreversible processes of de-Westernization. In this view, President Obama’s move was indeed a counter-reformation, similar to the Catholic counter-reformation responding to Protestant reformation. The difference between these countermovements, beyond the political-theological motivations of the first and the political-economic interests of the second, is that de-Westernization moves beyond the boundaries of Western civilization. Western encroachment is unavoidable but not desirable. And that is extremely significant in the racial configuration of the world order: Chinese are ‘yellow’ people according to Linneus’s scientific classification and Kant’s political ranking of the world population (Eze, 1997). Russians are ‘slaves’ and Orthodox Christians. Iranians are Persian and Muslim. In the middle swinging right and left are Indians who are brown and Hindu, and Turkey, too, where people have white skin though they are Turks and Muslims. The undercurrent of colonial/imperial differences taints globalization, guiding global linear thinking domestically and in the inter-State system. The current situation is well known: intensifying efforts by the US to contain China, demonize Russia and destroy Iran, India and Turkey playing both sides to their own advantage while maintaining an uncompromising and deafening silence.

Summarizing this point and connecting with the history of CMP orienting the winds of globalization, what transpires is that in the inter-State configuration in the modern/colonial world system since the sixteenth century, Western states monarchic and secular created, shaped, transformed, managed and controlled the CMP that undergirded the process of Westernization. De-Westernization put a halt to the last chapter of Westernizing designs: neoliberal globalization. De-Westernization is an inter-State led project that does not question CMP in its foundation and procedures but disputes who controls it. That is why Xi Jinping was prompt to take the driver’s seat when Donald Trump returned to nationalism promoting his MAGA project. Obviously, he is not dropping the pretense of the US as World Leader. It only changed the way he thinks it should be done and letting Xi Jinping taking up the leadership of globalization (Domonoske, 2017). Now, the question here shall not be who will win and whether China will be the next hegemon. Thought in those terms is limited to the logic of Western modernity that always requires a winner and cannot conceived the world order without one single world leader. De-Westernization is changing the content of these conversations: introducing multipolarity (Bajpaee, 2017; Kupchan, 2012; Shapiro, 2018) as the envisioned world order, displacing unipolarity which was has been the goal of Westernization and is being updated by re-Westernization (Brzezinski, 2012; Kissinger, 2014). The dispute between re-Westernizing intents to maintain unipolarity and de-Westernization’s irreversible delinking, rejecting pressures to support multipolarity, will most likely shape the turbulence of the upcoming ‘infamous decade’.

Yet a third trajectory will contribute to this upcoming decade of turbulence: decoloniality at large. By this I do not mean a single and universal decolonial mode (with variations), like Christianity (and secular Conservatism), Liberalism or Marxism, the three systems of ideas that consolidated by 1850. Nor do I mean all protests and organizations rejecting the CMP that confront de-Westernization and re-Westernization as a result, framed in the specific decolonial vision that emerged from the work of Aníbal Quijano (Mignolo, 2011). By decoloniality at large I mean all protests and organizations of the emerging global political society that are contesting, rejecting and delinking from the CMP, not all at once, but from the specific aspects – knowledge and understanding,
governance, economy and humanness – that drive the protests and motivate the self-organization of the political society. Decoloniality at large refers to every and all praxes of communal self-liberation, notwithstanding whether decoloniality is invoked to reject and delink from specific areas of the CMP’s control and management.

Last but not least, decoloniality today mutated its meaning and objectives vis-à-vis its prior meaning during the Cold War. Briefly stated the story goes like this. During the Cold War, decolonization was either a State-led project, like it was the Bandung Conference of 1955, or of people’s struggles for liberation from settler colonialism in order to create their own nation-States (e.g. India, Algeria, Angola). During the years that decolonization was at full blast rejecting Westernization, two counter-decolonizing events took place in 1948: the consolidation of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the foundation of the Zionist state of Israel. Today, decolonial praxes don’t aim anymore to found or take control of existing nation-States, but to restitute what has been destituted and that drives the protests, motivating people and political organizations independently from the State. Chiefly, human dignity. To do so, it is imperative to engage in the reconstitution of knowing and sensing. No restitution would be possible within Western categories of thoughts (epistemology) and modern/postmodern subject formation and expectations (aesthetics at large, beyond the narrow confines of the ‘fine arts’). Epistemology and aesthetics (gatekeepers of both a Western modern and postmodern frame of mind) have to be, and the work is in the making to do it, reconstituted as of gnoseology and aethesis. That means that genoseological and aesthetic reconstitution turn out to be the main task of decoloniality today. Which is what I am intending to do in the argument I am unfolding. Gnoseological and aesthetic reconstitution goes hand in hand with protests and organizations not only tearing down statues but, above all, questioning the epistemic and aesthetic foundations of the work achieved by the figures consecrated and monumentalized by the statues (Cavert, 2020; Draper, 2020; Lazare, 2020). Without gnoseological and aesthetic reconstitution ‘the subaltern couldn’t speak’ because their voice will be swallowed up by the hegemony of Western epistemology and aesthetics.

By the nineties, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became evident that the nation-State could no longer be the final destination of decolonization. While decolonization was victorious in ejecting the settler from their occupied territory, it failed in offering wellbeing to the majority of the newly formed decolonial states which, as Frantz Fanon was already perceiving in 1961, fell in the hands of local elites that became dependents (to their benefit) politically, economically and culturally of their former imperial masters. Decoloniality increasingly became, during the nineties and significantly in the twenty-first century, the task of the political society detached from the respective nation-States in which the struggle to recover the destituted human dignity of the majority of the global population is taking place. This struggle is moved by the dignified anger of women and men, heterosexual and LGBTQ+, black and white, yellow and brown of many lands and languages that the implementation of the CMP has engendered through the centuries. The recent escalation in the Western implementation of CMP in the efforts to re-Westernizing the world by containing both de-Westernization and the variegated decolonial insurrections of the political society is at once a desperate effort, trying to maintain unipolarity while de-Westernization claims multipolarity and decoloniality builds pluriversality. Signs of a change of epoch are right here: multipolarity in the inter-State system and pluriversality in decolonial affirmations to restitute ways of knowing, sensing and believing that globalization since the sixteenth century as well as the neoliberal version since the end of the twentieth has been consistingly destituting.
IV

A very short coda. As COVID-19 prompts consideration of all possible future scenarios, one is troubling for its potential to contribute to the redirection of globalism under the banner of globalization and massively displace wealth from industrial to technological and financial sectors. The other is the failure of neoliberal globalism to homogenize the planet at its will, desire and convenience. The third is the continuing disregard for life, accelerating the mutation of the living planet into natural resources and the human species into human resources (e.g. climate change and the surplus of human beings). The fourth and as consequences of the third is that the decay of the US and the North Atlantic and the privileges (political, economic, epistemic, theological, aesthetic, technological, etc.) acquired in the past 500 years at the expense of the rest of the people in the planet are difficult to lose. As wounded tigers, the US and the EU are a dangerous for global equilibrium, if not peace and harmony. They are not ready to concede yet. To persist and maintain the privileges the rhetoric of modernity has to be reset disregarding the consequences of coloniality, the mould of modernity, globalism since the sixteenth century, and neo-liberalism, its last chapter. Reseting modernity (or postmodernity if you wish) is already in the making. This is one of the enthusiastic renewals of the same: The Great Reset projected for the January 2021 Global Economic Forum. Here is the new rhetoric of modernity at its present best:

As we enter a unique window of opportunity to shape the recovery, this initiative will offer insights to help inform all those determining the future state of global relations, the direction of national economies, the priorities of societies, the nature of business models and the management of a global commons. Drawing from the vision and vast expertise of the leaders engaged across the Forum’s communities, the Great Reset initiative has a set of dimensions to build a new social contract that honours the dignity of every human being.10

Whoever is familiar with Klaus Schwab’s book The Fourth Industrial Revolution, and with his task as founder and director of the Global Economic Forum, will understand the full meaning of The Great (global) Reset.

Notes

1. On civilizational states see, and see the respective grounds of the enunciation, Zhang Weiwei’ disobedient argument (Zhang, 2012). On the other hand, see the controlling argument (Coker, 2019). In support of Coker (see Rachman, 2019). On Weiwie’s side see Pabst (2019).
2. Williams (1944). William’s arguments, more so than his ‘facts,’ are relevant for my argument. For the reader interested in historic information about the slave trade, the following studies – which are not as relevant to my argument as Williams’s book’s argument is – could consult Thomas (1999), and Blackburn (2011).
4. The launchpad of neo-liberal globalization was Chile, 1973: the military coup that stopped democracy in the name of democracy. That is how the rhetoric of modernity works disguising the logic of coloniality (see, among many analyses, ‘The “Chicago Boys” in Chile’, 2016). See previous note on Hayek and Friedman.
5. Globalization was called into question early on. In 2000 Aníbal Quijano published a key essay framing globalization in the unfolding of the colonial matrix of power (patrón colonial de poder), hence framing globalization decolonially. See Lima:The Róbinson Rojas Archives, 2000, https://rrojasdatabase.info/pfpc/quijano02.pdf. For Quijano it was not a new phenomenon. It was an unfolding of ‘structural depency’ that was explored in detail in South America in the sixties (Faletto, Cardoso, Marini, etc.). Gunther Frank provided the Eurocentered view in English for a US audience (see Cardoso, 1977). For Quijano, and for us following him, globalization (e.g. neoliberal globalism) was another chapter
in the unfolding of the colonial matrix of power, the last chapter of the second nomos of the earth. My argument is indebted to this legacy. In that context, an earlier decolonial critique when development was the concept that globalism refurbished, Walter Rodney’s argument remains a signpost when globalizalism is felt in South and Central America and the Caribbean (see Rodney, 2002). The previous chapters in this unfolding were modernization and development, from 1950 to 1970, when the US assumed global leadership. For an early critical North Atlantic perspective, the reader could consult (Amoore et al., 2000, pp. 12–28).

6. For more detail see Mignolo and Walsh (2018) and Mignolo (2021). This argument is built on the premises and arguments from this book.

7. The issue is extremely relevant but to elaborate on it would take me away from the argument I am unfolding. But I would like to provide the following information. Patriarchy in the conceptual and political decolonial frame is not a question of gender but it is systemic. In Aníbal Quijano’s concept of ‘patrón colonial de poder’, ‘patrón’ means both patrón and pattern. Julieta Paredes, Aymara intellectual, activist and ‘feminista comunitaria’ reconceptualizes patriarchy from an Indigenous perspective: ‘We say: patriarchy is the system of all oppressions, of all exploitations, of all violence and discrimination experienced by humanity (women, men and intersex people) and by nature, historically built on the sexed bodies of women’ https://journals.openedition.org/corpusarchivos/1835#tocto1n5. This Argentinian feminist, activist and intellectual leader is revising the notion of patriarcado from a decolonial perspective, following Quijano’s legacies (Segato, 2016). The Zapatistas are very well known for rebuilding the communal and disengaging (delinking) from the social and the State. Zapatistas’ women and men are confronting patriarchy as a system of multiple oppressions. https://nacla.org/news/2019/01/18/spark-hope-ongoing-lessons-zapatista-revolution-25-years. For the European readers, a more familiar take on patriarchy could be Öcalan (2020).

8. These signs have been obviously felt in the experience and perspective of de-Westernisation (see Khanna, 2019a, pp. 1–24; 2019b, pp. 327–356; Mahbubani, 2008, pp. 127–174).

9. Confront the Western desire to maintain its privileges and awareness that social, economic and cultural forces are moving in different directions (see Kissinger, 2014; Brzezinski, 2012).


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